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Abstract 
This research explores the Department of Defense (DoD) Government 
Purchase Card Program.. This research identifies fraud indicators within the DoD 
Government Purchase Card Programs and provides recommendations for improving 
the management of Government Purchase Card Programs within the DoD. First, a 
brief background of the DoD Government Purchase Card Program is provided. 
Second, based on GAO reports and OIG audits, incidents of procurement card fraud 
are discussed. Third, fraud indicators in Government Purchase Card Programs are 
identified. Fourth, Government Purchase Card Program Internal Control Issues are 
addressed. Finally, the research concludes with a summary and areas for further 
research. 
Keywords: Department of Defense, government purchase card programs, 
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Executive Summary 
The general public demands better stewardship, efficient management of 
funds, and greater accountability for resources by government organizations (Mills, 
Normand, & Palmer, 2008). While the increased use of purchase cards has been 
determined to be beneficial in terms of cost reductions and decreased red tape 
processing procedures, there has also been a marked increase in misuse and 
fraudulent activity in purchase card programs throughout government agencies, 
including the Department of Defense (DoD) (Government Accountability Office 
[GAO], 2008, 2001).  
In light of all the recent federal procurement scandals, the emergence of 
additional guidance for government purchase card programs (GPCP) has been 
steadily increasing.  The more approving officials and cardholders are aware of 
perceived weaknesses in internal controls, the more likely they will be to take 
appropriate steps to reduce the potential for fraudulent activities. Potential indicators 
of fraudulent activity are clues or red flags that warrant a closer investigation into a 
certain area or activity. Intent is the key determining factor as to whether a particular 
situation is deemed fraud or mere negligence. The DoD Inspector General’s website, 
as well as other agency sites, provides fraud guidance for their auditors, citing 
numerous, but not all-inclusive, possible purchase card fraud indicators. 
DoD Inspector General audits of GPCPs agency-wide have resulted in the 
identification of various purchase card fraud indicators, such as cardholders making 
unauthorized purchases over the weekend or off-duty hours, cardholders and/or 
approving officials not adhering to policies and management controls, cardholders 
approving their own purchase authorizations instead of following required 
authorization mandates, and cardholders not following policies regarding separation 
of duties (GAO, 2003; DoD Inspector General [DoDIG], 2010, 2007). 
Federal government officials, such as GPCP approving officials and 
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standards, especially when working with millions of taxpayer dollars on behalf of the 
American people. Because fraud is a serious problem throughout the nation and in 
the public procurement arena, it is crucial that procurement officials receive the 
appropriate training and learn the skills necessary to deter and detect fraud within 
agency-wide GPCPs. Unfortunately, many government executives have failed to 
implement and follow the existing internal control policies that are in place to help 
deter and detect fraudulent activities (GAO, 2008). 
This research explores the DoD GPCP. This research identifies fraud 
indicators within the DoD GPCPs and provides recommendations for improving the 
management of the GPCPs within the DoD. First, a brief background of the DoD 
GPCP is provided. Second, based on GAO reports and Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) audits, incidents of procurement card fraud are discussed. Third, fraud 
indicators in the GPCPs are identified. Fourth, the GPCP internal control issues are 
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I. Introduction 
The purpose of this research paper is to identify procurement fraud indicators 
in Defense agencies, specifically in the area of GPCPs.  The areas covered in this 
research paper include a brief background of the Department of Defense (DoD) 
Government Purchase Card Program, a discussion of incidents of procurement card 
fraud, and the identification of fraud indicators in the GPCPs. In addition, the GPCP 
internal control issues are also addressed. A summary and conclusion will be 
provided, and areas for further research will be identified. 
As of 2006, the United States GPCP was approximately eight times larger 
than the next largest purchase card program in the commercial card world (Fischer, 
2006). With billions of taxpayer dollars being spent on goods and services by the 
federal government on behalf of the American people, the general public demands 
better stewardship, efficient management of funds, and greater accountability for 
resources by government organizations (Mills, Normand, & Palmer, 2008).  Over the 
years, the government purchase card program has become an increasingly valuable 
and vital tool in government agencies in efforts to streamline their procurement 
process and meet their missions, especially in the DoD. The following section will 
provide a brief background of the DoD GPCP. 
A. Background of Department of Defense Government 
Purchase Card Program 
The subject of government purchase cards dates back to 1982 when 
President Ronald Reagan issued an executive order directing executive government 
agencies to decrease administrative procurement costs (Government Accountability 
Office [GAO], 1996). The overall goals of the GPCP are to save taxpayer money by 
reducing the administrative costs associated with the purchase of commercially 
available goods and services, and by reducing the procurement red tape and lead 
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Federal agencies acquire purchase cards from banks that have been 
awarded contracts under the GSA SmartPay program. U.S. Bank services the Army, 
Air Force, and Defense agencies, and Citibank services the Navy and Marine Corps 
(DoD, 2002). 
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]) oversees the agency-wide government purchase card 
program (GPCP). The Purchase Card Program Management Office (PCPMO) is 
responsible for policy formulation, procedural guidance, and operational oversight of 
the GPCP administered by DoD components, and it reports to the Director of 
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy in the OUSD(AT&L). 
The Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) office, headed by 
Mr. Shay Assad, is responsible for all acquisition and procurement policy matters in 
the DoD and serves as the main advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) and the Defense Acquisition 
Board on acquisition/procurement strategies for all major weapon systems 
programs, major automated information systems programs, and services 
acquisitions (DPAP, 2011). Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Part 13 (2011), 
and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), Part 213 
(1999), govern the use of purchase cards (DoD, 2002). 
The SmartPay Program, known as the largest government charge card 
program in the world, provides 350 federal agencies, organizations, and tribal 
governments’ commercial charge card-based procurement and payment assistance 
to make efficient and convenient procurement transactions. According to the GSA, 
which administers the program under a master contract, the SmartPay Program has 
saved federal agencies an estimated $1.8 billion in annual administrative processing 
costs, as compared to previous, paper-based procurement card processes. The 
Office of Charge Card Management (OCCM) within GSA manages the GSA 
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The use of government purchase cards has skyrocketed since the purchase 
cards first became available in 1986. Struebing (1996) found that during the first 
year that the government purchase cards were made available agency-wide, there 
were approximately 271,000 purchases made, worth approximately 64 million 
taxpayer dollars. By the end of FY1995, cardholders used the purchase card to 
purchase more than 1.6 billion taxpayer dollars worth of goods and services 
(Struebing, 1996). Most government officials agree that the FAR needs to address 
the use of government purchase cards more thoroughly and provide ways in which 
government agencies can share best practices in the area of purchase card 
programs (GAO, 1996).  
As shown in Figure 1, during FY2009, the agency-wide government purchase 
card program, which includes purchase, travel, and fleet cards, totaled 3.1 million 
cardholders, 93.2 million transactions, and $29.8 billion in spending; and during 
FY2010, the GPCP program totaled 3.1 million cardholders, 98.9 million in 
transactions, and $30.2 billion in spending (GSA, 2011). This is quite an 
accomplishment, given that the government purchase card program initially 
experienced a slow start in the 1980s. Even though the program was widely 
recognized as a good opportunity to streamline payments and reduce cost, at first, it 
was not fully supported by all federal agencies (Fischer, 2006). For 2010, the 
Department of Defense was the top agency by program spend, with more than 
$13,257,132,377, or 44% of total spend (GSA, 2011c). 
Fischer (2006) notes that the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, 
which authorized an increase to the mirco-purchase dollar value up to $2,500 
(currently $3,000) for any single purchase, along with the mandated reinventing 
government initiative, helped catapult the GPCP, resulting in significant growth of the 
agency-wide program. Empowered agency administrators suddenly embraced the 
government purchase card as a tool to help them reduce cost and improve 
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Even though the DoD Charge Card Task Force (DoD, 2002) noted that the 
cost savings is estimated to be approximately $20 per transaction, according to the 
GSA, federal government agencies save approximately $53.77 in administrative 
costs for each card purchase and payment, as compared to the normal procurement 
process involving a check payment (Fischer, 2006). Palmer, Gupta, and Dawson 
(2010) note that the federal government estimates cost savings from using the 
government purchase card to be in the range of $54 to $92 per transaction, with the 
best estimate being $69 per transaction, when compared to the cost of the paper 
processing of a purchase order, requisition, and payment. While the amount of 
savings per transaction may vary, it is still a well-documented fact that there is a cost 
savings benefit from using purchase cards (Fischer, 2006; Palmer, Gupta, & 
Dawson, 2010; DoD, 2002).  
Use of the purchase card has allowed DoD federal agencies to replace the 
time-consuming paper-based purchase order process for micro-purchases, which 
results in lower procurement lead time, transaction cost, and procurement office 
workload. As of FY2001, DoD agencies use purchase cards for over 95% of 
qualified transactions (DoD, 2002). According to the GSA, only 2% of the total 
federal government spending are purchases under $2,500, but constitute over 85% 
of the total procurement transaction volume. The GSA has determined that the use 
of purchase cards has decreased the time that is required to properly process paper 
transactions by two to six weeks (Palmer, Gupta, & Dawson, 2010). In addition, the 
average government purchase card transaction amount has steadily increased from 
$436 in 1997, to $779 in 2008 (Palmer, Gupta, & Dawson, 2010). 
The GSA SmartPay program office provides government charge cards to U.S. 
government federal agencies through negotiated master contracts with charge card 
providers. Currently, Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, and U.S. Bank provide the 
following types of charge cards to federal agencies to support their mission needs 
(GSA, 2011a): 
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 Travel Cards: For payment of travel expenses related to official 
government travel (airline, hotel, meals, incidentals); 
 Fleet Cards: For payment of fuel and supplies for government 
vehicles; and 
 Integrated Cards: For procurements of two or more business lines 
(card types) whose processes are integrated into one card. 
While there are several types of government charge cards, the focus of this 
research was on the purchase cards.  Figure 2, GSA SmartPay Program—Purchase 
Card (FY1999 to FY2008), shows a downward trend for the number of cardholders, 
yet an upward trend in purchase card transactions and purchase card spending. 
Even though in 2009, the number of cardholders, transactions, and spending slightly 
decreased, currently, the number of cardholders remains steady, while the number 
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Figure 2. GSA SmartPay Program—Purchase Card (FY1999 to FY2008) 
(GSA, 2011c) 
On January 15, 2009, the OMB issued OMB Circular A-123, Appendix B 
Revised, in efforts to consolidate current government-wide charge card program 
requirements and guidance issued by the OMB, GSA, Department of the Treasury 
(Treasury), and other federal agencies (OMB, 2009). 
According to the Treasury Financial Manual for Guidance of Departments and 
Agencies (TFM 4-4500), the government-wide commercial purchase card may be 
used to do the following (FMR, 2010): 
1. Make micro-purchases (currently $3,000); 
2. Place a task or delivery order (if authorized in the basic contract, basic 
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3. Make payments when the contractor agrees to accept payment by the 
purchase card. 
Per the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) training materials for the online 
GPCP course, the DFARS (1999) 213.270 states that, except under certain limited 
circumstances, the government purchase card is the mandatory method of purchase 
and/or payment at or below the micro-purchase threshold, currently $3,000 (DAU, 
2010). There are several key players in a government purchase card program, which 
include the agency/organization program coordinator (APC), the supervisor, the 
approving official (AO), the certifying official (CO), and the cardholder. For the DoD, 
the Approving Official acts as the Certifying Official; and for the U.S. Air Force, the 
Financial Service Officer (FSO) serves as the Certifying Officer (DAU, 2010). 
All of these players have important roles within the GPCP and are held to a 
high standard of integrity (DAU, 2010). They each hold a public trust and are 
expected to meet the highest ethical standards. One of these key players is the 
cardholder who is responsible for the following (DAU, 2010): 
 Completing the proper GPCP training, 
 Receiving the proper authorization in accordance with agency 
procedures, 
 Making sure the card is used "For Official Use Only,"  
 Providing accurate information and data to the GPCP Certifying 
Official, 
 Seeking the advice from the activity fiscal attorney when questioning 
use of funds for specific purchases, and 
 Reporting any abuse, misuse, or fraud.   
Another key player is the AO (or billing official) who is usually the cardholder’s 
direct supervisor or someone who can influence the cardholder’s performance 
appraisal and recommend any warranted disciplinary action when necessary.  Some 
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 Making sure that cardholder transactions meet the legal requirements 
for authorized purchase card transactions,  
 Verifying adequate supporting documentation for any purchase card 
transactions, 
 Confirming the completeness and accuracy of the facts presented in 
the cardholder’s documentation, 
 Ensuring that cardholders follow all required policies and procedures 
regarding government purchase card acquisitions, 
 Retaining certified billing statements and supporting documents for the 
prescribed length of time according to Federal Acquisition Regulations, 
and 
 Reporting any abuse, misuse, or fraud. 
Furthermore, as stated in the DAU (2010) online training course, federal 
agencies must minimize conflict of interest issues when appointing Approving 
Officials by adequately and appropriately implementing separation of duties, which 
helps in the determent of fraud or embezzlement.   
Although credit worthiness evaluations are required for travel cardholders, the 
credit worthiness evaluations for new purchase card applicants are no longer 
legislatively mandated, due to the passage of the 2006 Consolidated Appropriations 
Act. However, agency officials and charge card managers are allowed to continue 
requiring these evaluations at their discretion, as they consider the risks involved 
with charge card issuance (OMB, 2009). It is the author’s opinion that the credit 
worthiness evaluations should be required for purchase cardholders as they are for 
travel cardholders. It is imperative that all cardholders are evaluated for credit 
worthiness since they are being put in a position to spend taxpayer dollars, 
especially during challenging economic times. It does not make sense to allow a 
government employee who has a bad credit rating to use a government credit card.  
In addition, non-procurement cardholders are not subject to the same 
restrictions as contracting officers, nor do they have the extensive training, 
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cardholders generally have the benefit of free discretion when selecting vendors, 
products, and services, which, if left unchecked, could lead to abusive or even 
fraudulent behavior when using the government purchase card. The following 
section will discuss incidents of government procurement card fraud as identified in 
some GAO and OIG government purchase card program audit results. 
B. Incidents of Government Procurement Card Fraud 
The DoD GPCP is subject to periodic audits in accordance with Title 10 
United States Code (U.S.C.), section 2784(b)(8), by the DoD Inspector General and 
the military Services’ audit agencies (DoD, 2010c). 
Over the years, the escalating federal government procurement fraud 
scandals have created a need to seriously revisit the reality of the epidemic of 
procurement fraudulent activities across federal agencies. In 2002, the GAO found 
significant internal control weaknesses in government agency purchase card 
programs that allowed cardholders to make fraudulent purchases (GAO, 2002a; 
GAO 2002b). Also in 2002, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) 
opened investigations which involved individuals allegedly involved in credit card 
fraud. Additionally, the DCIS completed cases which have resulted in jail terms and 
probation, as well as restitution (Kozaryn, 2002). 
According to a GAO (2008) report, even though the purchase card is an 
effective tool that helps agencies reduce transaction costs for small purchases and 
provides flexibility in making acquisitions, internal controls breakdowns and 
weaknesses over the use of purchase cards leave the government highly vulnerable 
to fraud, waste, and abuse.  Table 1 illustrates examples of how the government 
purchase card has been flagrantly misused and abused. Some issues with the 
inappropriate and fraudulent card use include problems with transaction 
authorization, receipt and acceptance of goods purchased, and accountability of 
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recommendations to improve internal control and oversight of the GPCP in efforts to 
reduce instances of fraudulent, improper, and abusive purchases. 
The GAO defines fraudulent, improper, and abusive transactions as follows: 
Fraudulent purchases or transactions include those made by 
cardholders that were unauthorized and intended for personal use, purchases 
made using purchase cards or account numbers that had been stolen or 
compromised, and purchases appropriately charged to the purchase card but 
that involve potentially fraudulent activity that went undetected because of the 
lack of integration among processes related to the purchase, such as travel 
claims or missing property. 
Improper transactions are those purchases that although intended for 
government use, are not permitted by law, regulation, or government/agency 
policy. 
Abusive purchase card transactions involve transactions that are 
deficient and improper when compared with behavior that a prudent person 
would consider reasonable and necessary, for example, purchases that were 
made at excessive cost (wasteful) or were not needed by the government, or 
both (GAO, 2008, p. 20). 
In 2008, the GAO identified fraudulent, improper, and abusive activity in 
government-wide purchase card programs and made thirteen recommendations to 
the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) in efforts to minimize fraudulent, improper, and abusive card activities 
and to improve oversight of purchase cards (GAO, 2008).  While the OMB, which is 
taking a proactive approach to purchase card management, agreed with the 
recommendations, the GSA only partially agreed. Even though the GSA manages 
the government purchase card program, the GSA did not concur that it had the 
authority to assist government agencies with improving their internal controls. The 
OMB may be able to assist the GSA in overcoming the lack of authority perception 
(GAO, 2008). 
Weaknesses and breakdowns in internal controls in government purchase 
card programs government-wide caused numerous fraudulent, improper, and 
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activities that the GAO found, including a case in which a cardholder embezzled 
over $642,000 from the Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service firefighting fund. 
The fraudulent activities, which took place over a period of six years, were not 
detected until 2006, when a whistleblower reported the cardholder to the agency’s 
Office of Inspector General. This particular cardholder, who used the embezzled 
funds to pay for personal expenses, such as gambling and mortgage payments, was 
ordered to pay full restitution and sentenced to 21 months in prison (GAO, 2008).  
Table 1. Fraudulent, Improper, and Abusive Purchases by Cardholders 
(GAO, 2008) 
 
Tables 2–5 illustrate incidents in which fraud or indications of fraud were 
found after investigations of government purchase card programs agency-wide by 
the GAO (2008). Some examples of fraud include purchases of online dating 
services by Army officials and U.S. Postal Service officials, as well as numerous 
instances of personal use purchases. In addition, the GAO found that agencies were 
not able to account for $2.7 million of pilferable items such as laptop computers, 
iPods, and digital cameras (GAO, 2008). 
Once fraud is suspected, notification should be made to the Management 
Control Administrator, and the approving official (or billing official) or the Agency 
Program Coordinator (APC) should contact their respective law enforcement 
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Investigations (FBI), Naval Criminal Investigative Services (NCIS), United States 
Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC), or Air Force Office of Special 
Investigations (AFOSI), or contact the DoD fraud hotline. 
Table 2. Fraudulent and Potentially Fraudulent Activity 
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Table 3. Fraudulent and Potentially Fraudulent Activity 
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Table 4. Fraudulent and Potentially Fraudulent Activity 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 16 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Table 5. Fraudulent and Potentially Fraudulent Activity 
Source: (GAO, 2008, p. 24) 
 
The GAO (2002b) identified breakdowns in internal control activities that had 
major and serious consequences. Potentially fraudulent, improper, and abusive and 
questionable transactions went undetected due to inadequate or poor internal 
controls at several Army commands. The GAO notes that potentially fraudulent 
transactions include cardholder purchases that are intended for personal use and 
benefit, unauthorized transactions by vendors, or other purchases using 
compromised accounts (GAO, 2002b). As shown in Table 6, tens of thousands of 
dollars were spent on personal use items such as jewelry, computers, clothing, 
groceries, escort services, etc., by cardholders, approving officials, and other agency 
employees (GAO, 2002b). While these personal use purchases were identified at 
Army commands, unfortunately, this type of fraudulent and abusive behavior 
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Table 6. Examples of Potentially Fraudulent Army Purchase Card Transactions 
(GAO, 2002b, p. 44) 
 
After an audit of the Forest Service’s government purchase card program, the 
GAO (2003) found that internal control weaknesses resulted in instances of 
improper, wasteful, and questionable purchases. As shown in Table 7, the GAO 
found various policy violations in the Forest Service’s government purchase card 
program for FY2001. Of the total $1,628,299 in purchases identified as improper 
payments, split purchases accounted for $1,285,252 (GAO, 2003, p. 25).  
Purchase cardholders use split purchase transactions to avoid exceeding the 
single purchase limit. Vendors comply with cardholders’ requests to split or separate 
the purchases into several invoices to circumvent the single transaction limit. Single 
purchase limits are put in place so that any purchases above the established limits 
will be subject to additional controls, in order to ensure that the purchases are 
appropriately reviewed and approved before government funds are obligated. 
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cardholders to avoid the purchase threshold, which is a violation of purchase card 
policy. An effective monitoring system would help identify split purchases, as well as 
other types of improper purchases, such as unauthorized purchases and duplicate 
transactions (GAO, 2003). 
Table 7. FY2001 Forest Service Purchase Card Program Categories of Improper 
Purchases 
(GAO, 2003, p. 25) 
 
According to a DoD Inspector General (DoDIG) report in 2002, purchase card 
audits and investigations revealed incidents of abuse and fraud, citing causes to 
include inadequate command emphasis and poorly enforced internal controls 
(DoDIG, 2002).  As a result of the highly publicized procurement fraud scandals, 
congressional leaders, such as Senator Charles Grassley, have called for more 
stringent oversight of government purchase card programs (Gupta & Palmer, 2007). 
On February 8, 2011, Senator Grassley and other co-sponsors introduced the 
Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act (2011), which calls for federal 
agencies to execute more stringent internal controls over purchase card usage. 
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Inspector 
General conducted an audit of the USAID government-wide commercial purchase 
card program and concluded that the USAID needed, among other things, to 
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1. Controls to Safeguard Purchase Cards 
2. Documentation of Purchase Card Approval and Usage 
3. Controls over the Segregation Of Duties 
4. Training of Cardholders and Approving Officials 
5. Oversight of Its Purchase Card Program 
When the DoD Inspector General (2007) investigated internal controls over 
the Army, Navy, and Air Force purchase card programs, it found that purchase card 
program officials at various military installations failed to establish and implement 
effective controls and oversight over their government purchase card programs. 
Furthermore, internal controls over purchase card program training at two of the 
three Navy installations visited were found to be weak and inadequate (DoDIG, 
2007).  
At the Defense Procurement Director’s request, the DoD Office of Inspector 
General prepared a summary report of purchase card audit report findings that 
identified misuse trends and problem areas in the government purchase card 
program (DoD, 2001). 
Of the 382 reports that were issued on the DoD government purchase card 
program from FY1996 through FY2001, Table 8 outlines the federal government 
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Table 8. Summary of Federal Agency Reports Issued on Government Purchase 
Card Programs FY1996 to FY2001 
(DoD, 2001) 
 
The systemic issues that were identified in the reports that were issued 
between FY1996 and FY2001 on government purchase card programs included the 
following: 
 Account Reconciliation and Certification (88 reports),  
 Administrative Controls (70 reports),   
 Management Oversight (115 reports),  
 Property Accountability (79 reports),  
 Purchase Card Use (50 reports),  
 Purchases (222 reports),  
 Separation of Duties (22 reports), and 
 Training (52 reports). (DoD, 2001) 
The GAO reports and Inspector General reports that were reviewed show a 
common thread throughout. The overarching issues found in many of the improper, 
abusive, and fraudulent activities have been related to the lack of properly 
implemented internal controls and oversight of government purchase card programs. 
These incidents of inappropriate behavior within the government purchase card 
programs can be reviewed for commonalities in terms of potential fraud indicators. 
Federal Agency Number of Reports Issued 
General Accounting Office 3 
DoD Inspector General 3 
Army Audit Agency 32 
Naval Audit Service 1 
Air Force Audit Agency 255 
Defense Agencies Inspector General & 
Internal Review Offices 
27 
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The following section will discuss potential fraud indicators in government purchase 
card programs. 
C. Fraud Indicators In Government Purchase Card Programs 
When DoD auditors are determining the fraud indicators and risk factors 
involved in a case, they should not merely take into consideration the materiality or 
monetary impact, but should also consider other important non-quantitative aspects, 
such as the safety and welfare of service members and civilians. If DoD auditors find 
fraud indicators or risk factors that relate to such qualitative factors, a significantly 
lower threshold should be used for categorizing an area as high risk. DoD auditors 
are expected to uphold their fiduciary duties and responsibilities to the Department 
of Defense, the U.S. government, and the public (DoDIG, 2011). 
Potential indicators of fraudulent activity are clues or red flags that warrant a 
closer investigation into a certain area or activity. Intent is the key determining factor 
as to whether a particular situation is deemed fraud or mere negligence. The DoD 
Inspector General’s website provides fraud guidance for their auditors, citing 
numerous, but not all-inclusive, possible purchase card fraud indicators. As outlined 
in Table 9, some possible purchase card fraud indicators include, but are not limited 
to, inadequate separation of duties such as cardholders approving their own 
purchase authorizations, cardholder and vendor having the same name, and similar 
invoices coming from different vendors (DoDIG, 2011). Many of the policies and 
procedures that would address many of these issues are included in the DoD 
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Table 9. Purchase Card Fraud Indicators 
(DoDIG, 2011) 
Purchase Card Fraud Indicators 
 Numerous missing invoices, receipts, and purchase justifications are 
noticed.  
 Receipts contain “white-outs,” date changes, and changes to product 
descriptions.  
 Purchased items are not recorded in inventory records.  
 Pattern of repeat favoritism to a specific vendor or group of vendors is 
seen.  
 Purchases fall at, or slightly below, the purchase threshold of $3,000.  
 Independent receipt and acceptance of purchased items are missing.  
 Organization does not conduct periodic reviews of cardholder purchases 
and inventory.  
 One cardholder, or a small number of cardholders, makes repeat 
purchases from a specific vendor.  
 Research shows that a vendor or company may not be authentic (i.e., 
phony business address, or no evidence that the company is incorporated, 
etc.); fictitious vendor.  
 Management does not follow established purchase card procedures such 
as requiring purchase justifications, independent receipt and acceptance of 
purchased items, and periodic reviews of cardholder transactions. 
 Cardholder makes unauthorized weekend purchases.  
  Cardholder pays an excessive amount for routine purchases.  
 Pattern of suspect cardholder purchases from unauthorized vendors such 
as clothing stores or suspect online vendors is detected.  
 Pattern of cardholder accounts with disputed charges is noted.  
 Purchase logs do not contain descriptions of items purchased.  
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 Inadequate separation of duties, such as cardholders approving their own 
purchase authorizations, is found.  
 Cardholder and vendor have the same name.  
 Cardholder account records are incomplete.  
 Cardholder accounts with several limit increases occur within a short time.  
 Cardholder purchases exceed the authorized card limit.  
 Purchases appear to be outside of the normal purchase pattern of the 
cardholder.  
 Similar invoices from different vendors are found.  
 Subversion of management controls by the cardholder and/or approving 
authority is detected.  
 Excessive number of cardholders is within an activity or unit.  
 Purchased items are available through the supply system.  
 Cardholder does not turn in premiums/free products obtained with 
purchases.  
 Organization has no established controls over purchases returned to stores 
for cash.  
 Purchase card assigned to an office or group of individuals instead of a 
specific person.  
 An excessive number of cardholders are assigned to one approving official.
 Separated employees continue to make purchases using the government 
purchase card.   
In addition, the Air Force Audit Agency’s (AFAA) handbook on fraud and 
waste indicators defines fraud as “an illegal act where one obtains something of 
value through willful misrepresentation” (Air Force Audit Agency, 1997, p. 1). The 
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1. Intent—willfully committing a wrongful act which must be proven 
through a pattern of activity, such as repeated engagement in the 
wrongful activity or making conflicting statements. 
2. Disguise of Purpose—misrepresentations made to accomplish the 
scheme when representations are made that were false by either 
omission or commission. 
3. Reliance—the offender knowingly makes a misrepresentation that is 
relied upon and acted upon by the victim. 
4. Voluntary—the victim assists the offender; for example, in a case of 
employee theft, the victim (the Air Force) entrusted the care of assets 
to the offender, which established a fiduciary capacity. 
5. Concealment—hiding or preventing knowledge of the fraudulent 
activity. 
6. Injury or Damage—the victim (the Air Force) suffers a loss of money or 
property because he/she relied and acted upon the misrepresentation.  
(Air Force Audit Agency, 1997, pp. 1–2) 
Red flags or fraud indicators can be categorized into  situational and 
opportunity red flags for either personal gain or for organizational benefit, and 
personal characteristics red flags, which include low moral character, wheeler-dealer 
attitude, rationalization of contradictory behavior, poor credit rating or financial 
status, and lack of stability (Air Force Audit Agency, 1997, pp. 4–7). Table 10 shows 
examples of situational red flags or fraud indicators, which include such things as 
living beyond one’s means or inadequate income or greed, for personal gain; and 
urgent need for favorable performance or temporary bad situation, for organization 
benefit. Table 11 shows examples of opportunity red flags or fraud indicators, such 
as close association with suppliers and key people, or too much trust in key 
employees, for personal gain; and poor internal controls or related party 
transactions, for organizational benefit. It should be noted that these fraud indicators 
are merely an indication of possible fraudulent activities; they do not guarantee that 
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Table 10. Situational Red Flags/Fraud Indicators 
(Air Force Audit Agency, 1997, p. 4) 
For Personal Gain For Organizational Benefit 
High personal debt or losses Heavy expenditures 
Living beyond one’s means Urgent need for favorable performance 
Gambling or speculation Revoked or imperiled mission status 
Excessive use of alcohol or liquor Unfavorable economic conditions 
Perceived inequities in the organization Temporary bad situation 
Resentment of supervisors Insufficient working capital/equipment 
Inadequate income or greed Obsolete inventories/production assets 
 
Table 11. Opportunity Red Flags/Fraud Indicators 
(Air Force Audit Agency, 1997, pp.5-6) 
For Personal Gain For Organizational Benefit 
Familiarity with operations and position 
of trust 
Related party transactions 
Close association with suppliers and key 
people 
Poor accounting records 
Dominant top management Poor internal controls 
Dishonest or unethical management Inexperienced people in key positions 
Too much trust in key employees Reluctant to give auditors needed data 
Rapid turnover of key employees Continuous problems with inspectors 
Inadequate training programs Highly computerized organization 
Weak or dishonest personnel 
evaluations 
Inadequate staffing in critical positions 
According to the National Association of Purchasing Card Professionals 
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processing costs versus using an organization’s normal procurement process. 
However, when the purchase card privileges are abused, and unauthorized or 
fraudulent purchases are made, any cost efficiencies gained through the use of the 
P-card may end up being lost (Goldmann, 2011).  P-card fraud is one type of 
procurement fraud that threatens organizations across all industries, especially 
during a tough economy. Some P-card red flags identified by Goldmann (2011) 
include the following: 
 P-cards are used for unusual purchases unrelated to the business; 
 An unusual number of purchases are made for amounts just below the 
organization’s minimum threshold amounts which require management 
approval;  
 Photocopied receipts are submitted with expense reports instead of 
original receipts; 
 Split payments are made for purchases, which may be an indicator of 
attempts to circumvent purchase limit rules; and  
 Receipts for purchases are forged.     
Other general red flags that could lead to fraudulent activities that were 
identified by various GAO reports and OIG audits include the following (DoDIG, 
2011): 
 Management override of key controls, 
 Inadequate or weak internal controls, 
 No written policies and procedures, 
 Overly complex organizational structure,  
 Key employee never taking leave or vacation, 
 High turnover rate, reassignment, firing of key personnel, 
 Missing electronic or hard copy documents that materialize later in the 
review, 
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 Photocopied documents instead of originals; Copies are poor quality or 
illegible, 
 “Unofficial” electronic files or records instead of “archived” or “official” 
files or records, 
 Revisions to electronic or hard copy documents with no explanation or 
support, 
 Computer-generated dates for modifications to electronic files that do 
not fit the appropriate time line for when they were created, 
 Missing signatures of approval or discrepancies in 
signature/handwriting, 
 Computer report totals that are not supported by source 
documentation, and  
 Lengthy unexplained delays in producing requested documentation. 
The GAO defines potentially fraudulent purchases as those that are 
unauthorized and intended for personal use (GAO, 2002a). Furthermore, 
government auditors use data mining techniques to help identify suspicious 
purchase card transactions by reviewing unusual or questionable transactions, such 
as those that occur on weekends, purchases from unauthorized vendors, split 
purchases, and purchases slightly below the $3,000 threshold for micro-purchases. 
Data mining is a computer-based tool that is used by auditors to sort through 
numerous amounts of data to pick out relevant information and reveal patterns 
(DoDIG, 2011).  
The myriad of fraud indicators identified in this research provide an overall 
foundation for the types of behavior and/or situations that could either lead to 
fraudulent use of government purchase cards, or point to ongoing fraudulent 
activities by government officials within the government purchase card programs 
agency-wide. As shown in the lists of fraud indicators identified, and in the fraudulent 
activities by government officials in the government purchase card programs, one of 
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strong internal controls. The following section will discuss government purchase card 
program internal control issues. 
D. Government Purchase Card Program Internal Control 
Issues 
1. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Internal Controls 
The importance of transparency, trust, and confidence in government 
governance cannot be overemphasized. The U.S. Congress, in response to public 
accounting failures, enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Act”) in efforts to 
deter fraudulent activities (Latshaw, 2003; Marden & Edwards, 2005). The Act 
revised the regulation of accounting firms that audit public companies, transformed 
corporate reporting and enforcement, and included internal control requirements for 
publicly traded companies (Lander, 2004).  Section 404 of the Act outlines the 
legislative requirements for internal controls for publicly traded companies 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002).  While the Act’s internal control requirements are for 
publicly traded companies, the components of internal controls are just as important 
in the federal government, specifically in the government purchase card programs 
agency-wide. As the GAO reports and IG audits indicate, internal control violations 
eroded the efficiency of controls over the management of government purchase card 
programs, which resulted in fraudulent activities (GAO, 2008). The next section will 
discuss the internal control framework. 
2. Internal Control Framework 
In compliance with the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) 
(1982) requirement, the General Accounting Office (GAO) developed relevant 
updated internal control guidance based on the private sector’s Internal Control–
Integrated Framework, which is published by the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (Whittington & Pany, 2012).  
Furthermore, the Chief Finanical Officers Act (1990) noted that billions of dollars 
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cited that these losses could be significantly reduced with improved management, 
internal controls, and financial accounting. In addition, the Federal Financial 
Management Improvement Act (1996) identified internal control as an important and 
integral component of improving financial management systems. Therefore, in 1999, 
the GAO issued “Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government” to 
assist government managers in achieving their missions and program results, and in 
improving accountability (GAO, 1999). 
Internal control is defined as a process designed to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories: (1) 
reliability of financial reporting, (2) effectiveness and efficiency of operations, and (3) 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations. The components of the internal 
control framework include the following (Whittington & Pany, 2012): 
1. The Control Environment, 
2. Risk Assessment, 
3. The Accounting Information System, 
4. Control Activities, and 
5. Monitoring. 
In a 2001 memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, 
Logistics, and Technology),  Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, 
Development, and Acquisition), Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), 
and directors of defense agencies, Bruce Sullivan, Director of the Purchase Card 
Joint Program Management Office, emphasized the need to allocate the appropriate 
resources necessary to have a system of internal and management controls in place 
that will help ensure the appropriate management of fraud related losses in order to 
protect the interests of the American public. He also addressed the issue of an 
appropriate span of control for billing officials, citing 5–7 cardholders per billing 
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Per the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, internal 
control activities, such as authorizations, verifications, reconciliations, and 
documentation, are essential in helping to ensure that management’s directives are 
accomplished (GAO, 2008). 
Gillett, Fink, and Johnson (1997) note that government agencies must 
implement proper internal controls to make sure that correct information is recorded 
and maintained, so that government purchases can be analyzed and reviewed in a 
timely manner. A serious breakdown in internal controls over purchase card 
programs can leave government agencies vulnerable to purchase card fraud and 
abuse (GAO, 2001). When government employees, such as cardholders and 
approving officials, overstep the boundaries of internal controls and established 
policies and procedures with a self serving interest at the expense of the American 
people, sustained public confidence in the procurement system is jeopardized. The 
increased fraud vulnerability due to lack of proper implementation of internal controls 
within the GPCPs, threatens the public’s trust in the procurement process.   
Colaianni (2005) believes that some internal controls that were implemented 
by the U. S. Department of State could prove useful in other GPCPs. She advocates 
the establishment of individual card dollar limits and the use of merchant category 
code restrictions. The enforcement of basic and refresher training and 
implementation of online training programs reduced administrative costs and 
increased procedure consistency at the Department of State. The identification of 
individual responsibilities and oversight and reporting requirements can also help 
improve GPCPs, such as developing a standardized checklist or template to assist 
employees with requirements.  In addition, the enforcement of annual program 
performance reviews assists in improving management oversight and increasing 
compliance with purchase card program requirements (Colaianni, 2005). 
After purchase card program audits and investigations revealed incidents of 
purchase card abuse, misuse, and fraud within the DoD, the Secretary of Defense 
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charge card programs. A DoD Charge Card Task Force, which included 
representatives from major defense organizations, was established to evaluate the 
DoD’s purchase card programs and develop recommendations for improvement 
(DoD, 2002).   
The task force focused on three major areas of investigation that included 
management emphasis and organizational culture, compliance, and process and 
workforce development. Even though the task force’s findings concluded that most 
DoD’s military and civilian personnel properly use purchase and travel charge cards 
and utilize appropriate fiscal stewardship of taxpayer dollars, they found that major 
problems do exist in government-wide purchase card programs. Some of the issues 
identified in the investigation included weak and unenforced internal controls, 
inadequate command emphasis of proper purchase card conduct, and lack of 
personal accountability (DoD, 2002). 
In order to significantly improve the DoD’s charge card programs, the task 
force made various recommendations which included increasing management 
emphasis on ethical conduct and personal accountability, strengthening internal 
controls and increasing the tools available to managers for enforcing those controls 
in efforts to detect fraudulent or abusive charge card transactions, and enhancing 
the capability of government employees to accomplish their assigned charge card 
responsibilities through proper training (DoD, 2002).  
The GAO found internal control weaknesses for Army, Navy, and Air Force 
purchase card programs as defined by DoD Instruction 5010.40, “Managers’ Internal 
Control (MIC) Program Procedures” (GAO, 2003; DoD, 2010).  GAO (2002b) found 
that weak internal controls in the government purchase program leave the Army 
highly vulnerable to potentially fraudulent, improper, and abusive purchases. 
Informal and incomplete operating procedures, as well as ineffective oversight of the 
purchase card program, were cited as two major contributors to the weak overall 
control environment at several Army commands. While the Army commands had 
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and provided inadequate internal control guidance, which resulted in a high failure 
rate between 40%– 86% for the control activity of approving official reviews, and 
resulted in potentially fraudulent transactions going undetected due to serious 
breakdowns in internal control (GAO, 2002b). 
In January 2007, an audit by the DoD Inspector General on the government 
purchase card programs of several military agencies resulted in a determination that 
GPCP officials need to strengthen their internal controls and proper program 
oversight in order for the Army, Navy, and Air Force to ensure continuous program 
improvement and risk mitigation essential for preventing fraud, waste, or 
mismanagement (DoDIG, 2007). 
Federal government officials, such as GPCP approving officials and 
cardholders, hold a public trust and are expected to meet the highest ethical 
standards, especially when working with millions of taxpayer dollars on behalf of the 
American people. Because fraud is a serious problem throughout the nation and for 
the public procurement arena, it is crucial that procurement officials receive the 
appropriate training and learn the skills necessary to deter and detect fraud within 
agency-wide Government Purchase Card Programs. Unfortunately, many 
government executives have failed to implement and follow the existing internal 
control policies that are in place to help deter and detect fraudulent activities (GAO, 
2008). Financial management transparency could be a significant and powerful fraud 
deterrent, and as Wells (2004) points out, occupational fraud is affected by the 
integrity level of government leaders and employees, and the perception of 
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II. Recommendations 
Many federal executives recognize the potential benefits that could result 
from the use of purchase cards; however, many are also concerned about the 
increased potential for fraudulent, abusive, and wasteful spending. The rampant 
wave of incidents of fraud, waste, and abuse found by the GAO and various Offices 
of Inspectors General, both in the civilian, as well as in the military agencies and 
organizations, have played a role in the decreasing number of cardholders 
throughout the years. 
What needs to be addressed in any analysis of the purchase card programs 
is the fact that incidences of purchase card fraud, abuse, and misuse involve 
taxpayer dollars—dollars that belong to the American people. Taxpayers should not 
be footing the bill for fraudulent and abusive purchases. There is still a debate 
between federal employees who want to improve government efficiency with little or 
no regard for the misuse of government purchase cards, and those who are 
seriously concerned about fraud, abuse, and misuse of the government purchase 
card. The fraudulent exploitation of taxpayer resources is a major issue and is a 
public interest that should not be taken lightly. Every dollar that is fraudulently spent 
takes away from funds that could be spent on goods and services that are needed 
by federal agencies to meet their missions in support of the overall goal of public 
service to the American people. 
Agency executives need to establish and implement purchase card policies 
that instill integrity, transparency, and accountability in their purchase card 
programs. The shift from low-value paper transactions to the purchase card was 
intended to save taxpayers money and eliminate the paperwork involved in the 
procurement process for micro-purchases, not to give federal government 
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Margaret A. Colaianni, the purchase card program manager of the 
Department of State, provides useful recommendations that could be implemented 
in other government purchase card programs. Colaianni (2005) believes that the 
three fundamental principles for the Department of State purchase card program--
standardization, centralization, and collaboration--could be helpful in other federal 
agencies’ government purchase card programs.  
Some best practices surfaced from the three underlying principles she 
identified that could assist agencies in meeting the challenges and demands of 
managing government purchase card programs. For example, she recommends that 
agencies standardize practices as much as possible, such as in the areas of 
cardholder purchasing logs, procedures, guidance, and practices. Standardized 
processes can help in the reduction of the administrative burden, the improvement of 
reconciliation procedures, the cutback of costs, and the decrease in processing 
times (Colaianni, 2005). 
Implemented as a cost-savings initiative to improve purchase processes and 
mission effectiveness, over the years, the DoD purchase card program has proven 
to be valuable, yet also vulnerable to abuse and fraud. While purchase cards come 
with an inherent risk of abuse, misuse, and fraud, GAO reports and DoDIG audit 
reports of purchase card programs government-wide show evidence of failures of 
the internal controls designed to alleviate that inherent risk. Furthermore, these 
types of failures cultivate the misperception that the Department of Defense is not 
able to effectively and efficiently manage the public resources with which it is 
entrusted (DoD, 2002). 
Colaianni (2005) believes that collaboration among team members, as well as 
with other agencies, participating banks, and the credit card associations, is vitally 
important. Sharing best practices and strategies that work in the management of 
government purchase card programs is essential to the long-term success of any 
government purchase card program. She also recommends collaboration, such as 
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that pays the invoices, and establishing written operating procedures at the local 
level, in addition to the agency-wide guidance and procedures. Furthermore, she 
suggests keeping program and hierarchy information updated to account for any 
employee turnover, as well as keeping cardholders’ established profile parameters 
current (Colaianni, 2005).  
As noted previously, in efforts to significantly improve the DoD’s charge card 
programs, the DoD Charge Card Task Force made various recommendations, which 
included increasing management emphasis on ethical conduct and personal 
accountability, strengthening internal controls and increasing the tools available to 
managers for enforcing those controls in efforts to detect fraudulent or abusive 
charge card transactions, and enhancing the capability of government employees to 
accomplish their assigned charge card responsibilities through proper training (DoD, 
2002). Merely having established internal control policies without implementing 
those policies is like not having any internal control policies in place at all. The 
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III. Summary & Conclusion 
This research explored the Department of Defense (DoD) Government 
Purchase Card Program. The specific purpose of this research was to identify fraud 
indicators within the DoD GPCPs. This research identified fraud indicators within the 
DoD GPCPs and provided recommendations for improving the management of 
GPCPs within the DoD. First, a brief background of the DoD GPCP was provided. 
Second, based on GAO reports and OIG audits, incidents of procurement card fraud 
were discussed. Third, fraud indicators in the GPCPs were identified. Fourth, GPCP 
internal control issues were addressed. In addition, areas for further research were 
discussed. 
The government purchase card program’s main goal was to provide federal 
agencies with an efficient way to purchase goods and services directly from vendors 
or suppliers (DoD, 2002). Even though purchase cards streamline the federal 
procurement process, the GAO reports since 2001 have shown that, if not managed 
and controlled appropriately, the use of government purchase cards can result in 
fraud, waste, and abuse (GAO, 2008). In light of all the recent federal procurement 
scandals, the emergence of additional guidance for GPCPs has been steadily 
increasing.  The more approving officials and cardholders are aware of perceived 
weaknesses in internal controls, the more likely they will be to take appropriate steps 
to reduce the potential for fraudulent activities.  
Over the last several years, the GAO has issued various reports and 
testimonies on the purchase card programs of different government agencies 
resulting in serious findings of fraudulent, improper, and abusive activities. These 
types of findings severely undermine the credibility of the GPCP (GAO, 2008). The 
federal government, in the face of severe fiscal challenges, spends billions of dollars 
annually through its purchase card programs.  Therefore, federal employees, such 
as cardholders, approving officials, and GPC program managers, who hold a 
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disposal, follow appropriate acquisition requirements, and ensure that purchase 
cards are being used responsibly (GAO, 2008). 
While Gupta and Palmer (2007) agree that the incidents of purchase card 
fraud, abuse, and misuse found by the GAO and various Offices of Inspectors 
General are unacceptable, they also believe that there could be a significant 
opportunity cost associated with an under-used purchase card program.  Therefore, 
government officials need to have a balanced approach to managing their GPCPs. 
As the U.S. government faces increased buying of commodities and services with 
less acquisition and finance personnel, the SmartPay program’s accomplishments to 
date have positioned it to continue improving the GPCP.   
The government needs to make sure that it spends the American taxpayers’ 
dollars wisely, efficiently, and effectively. It must find ways to reduce fraud, waste, 
and abuse. It is imperative that purchasing transactions result in the best value for 
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IV. Areas for Further Research 
The recent GAO reports and IG audits have shown that there is a need for 
research in the area of procurement fraud in the GPCP (GAO, 2008). The focus of 
this research was to identify fraud indicators that could be used by DoD agencies to 
improve purchase card programs. Other research that could be done would be to 
expand on the identified fraud indicators and lead to the development of an 
assessment tool to be used in the identification of procurement fraud vulnerabilities 
in the GPCP. In addition, an analysis by specific government agencies such as the 
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